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In recent years the production and consumption of services has been very important in developed
economies. The so-called tertiary sector accounts for a large part of their GDP and it employees
a large percentage of the labor force; the share of GDP in Europe, due to services, rose 52.2%
to 70% between 1970 and 2000. This growth does not depend only on changes in consumers'
preferences toward service goods; manufacturing rms use an increasing share of services as inputs
to their production process. The traditional sectors, such as machinery, equipment or textiles, use
services to organize production, sell their output and manage their nancial activities: transport,
banking, retailing, energy and telecommunications provide inputs which are fundamental for
rms' life cycles. Looking at input-output tables of OECD countries it is possible to observe
the rising importance of service providers as suppliers for manufacturing; for example UK rms
increased their service input from 25% in 1984 to 44% of 19951. In France, the share of services
increased by 17% in the period 1995-20002, at the end of which period services accounted for
28% of all inputs; nally in Italy services comprised 11% of manufacturing rms' costs in 3.
Nonetheless, despite these empirical observations, much of the economic literature does not
explicitly consider services as an input to production process.
Since an increasing proportion of the inputs to manufacturing sectors are services, I will
analyze in this paper, how competition in services plays a relevant role for downstream (man-
ufacturing) rms. Then paper's core aim is to explore whether competition in services aects
rms' performance, such as their productivity. Why should competition in services should aect
manufacturing rms' performance via inputs? There are three main reasons for this. First, more
competition in services may be a strong incentive to upgrade the quality of the services provided.
Second, resources no longer used to pay for inecient services, could be used by manufacturing
rms for other investments, such as R&D activities. Third, there may be positive spillover eects,
in terms of productivity, from service sectors to manufacturing. As the WTO has stated "it is
impossible for any country to prosper today under the burden of an inecient and expensive ser-
vices infrastructure. Producers and exporters of textiles, tomatoes or any other product will not
be competitive without access to ecient banking, insurance, accountancy, telecoms and trans-
port systems.... The benets of services liberalization extend far beyond the service industries
themselves; they are felt through their eects on all other economic activities[...] 4"
This paper's fundamental contributions are two. First, competition in services is measured
with dierent types of indices, using rm-level data, instead of using the indices provided by
institutions (Arnold et al., 2006). Second the contribution to the literature on liberalization and
competition in services is focused at the intersectoral linkage between services and with man-
ufacturing (using input-output tables). The paper also adds some insights into the process of
liberalization and deregulation of services in the EU which has taken place in the last ten years
(especially for networks). The basic motivation underlying this analysis, is that services and man-
ufacturing operate in two dierent competitive environments; in this framework a relevant issue
arises when the less competitive sector (services) sells inputs to the more competitive one (man-
ufacturing). Manufactured goods are usually involved in very competitive markets compared to
services, while many service rms operate in a monopolistic (energy) or very protected (nancial
or business activities) market. Unlike manufacturing, services do not suer from international
competition, so there is less competitive pressure in the in tertiary sector. When manufacturing
employs services as inputs in the production process the combination of anticompetitive domestic
1Riccardo Faini, Jonathan Haskel, Giorgio Barba Navaretti ,Carlo Scarpa, and Christian Wey "Contrasting
Europe's decline: do product market reforms help?" Fondazione de Benedetti 2004
2Eurostat: Input-Output Tables 2000
3"Il Sole 24 Ore" 19/06/2005
4WTO-GATS FactBook (2005).
1regulation and protection against foreign competitors could strengthen the monopoly power of
service providers and weaken the competitive position of those domestic rms that rely more
intensively on service inputs. Hence, while manufacturing has been increasingly exposed to the
forces of competition due to trade liberalization, services are relatively protected.
From a practical point of view the analysis is focused on France, instead of a developing
country (Arnold et al., 2006; Fernandes and Paunov, 2008). Input-output matrices are used to
evaluate the relative importance of services for each manufacturing sector. The data used are
at rm level both for services and for manufacturing: while for services particular attention is
devoted to network industries (energy distribution, transport and telecommunication), instead for
manufacturing production function is estimated in order to obtain rms' total factor productivity
(TFP).
The empirical estimations show that the market power of services aects downstream rms'
productivity. It is nd that there is a statistically signicant relation between rms' productivity
and competition in the service sector: as competition increases, so does the average productivity
of manufacturing. This relationship is stronger when only network industries are considered. A
second class of estimations then shows that the eect is not linear: up to a certain threshold,
market power has a positive eect on rms' productivity, perhaps due to the exploitation of
economies of scale. Thus perfect competition in services should not be an objective for policy
makers, especially in network sectors. Finally, it seems that large manufacturing rms benet
more than small rms from service liberalization.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, while Section 3
briey presents France's network services market. The data and empirical procedure are discussed
in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the results. Finally conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
Interest in the issue of service-sector liberalization and the input-output linkages between the
service and manufacturing sectors is quite recent. One of the most important papers on service
liberalization and manufacturing productivity is that by Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2006).
They show that service liberalization has had a positive impact on the average productivity of
downstream manufacturing rms in the Czech Republic. They empirically demonstrate that
liberalization in services improved the eciency of manufacturing rms. Using input-output
matrices for the Czech Republic they link the liberalization of services with rms' productiv-
ity; using ve dierent indices which proxy competition for each service sector, they are able
to evaluate the impact of liberalization on productivity and productivity growth. They also
emphasize that most of the barriers to foreign investment are in the service sector rather than in
manufacturing. They conclude that it is important to support market liberalization in services,
in particular by admitting new foreign investors. Their approach is based on the intuition that
services are used as inputs for production: better inputs (lower cost and higher quality) improve
performance in downstream sectors. In a similar paper, Fernandes and Paunov (2008) show, by
analyzing information about the use of services at plant level, that inward FDI service sectors
have a positive eect on manufacturing rms' productivity in Chile
An interesting contribution to this line of thinking is Amiti and Konings' (2007) paper. They
show that the productivity of Indonesian manufacturing rms increased when taxes on input
imports were reduced: where imported goods are used as inputs, a decrease of 10% in the
import tari increases the rms' productivity by 12%, on average, via learning and the variety
and quality eects. Amiti and Konings used a dataset of Indonesian manufacturing rms with
information about the composition of their inputs, in terms of quantity, type and origins for
2each rm. As trade liberalization was introduced they could demonstrate an increase in the
quantity (variety eect) and quality (quality eect) of the imported goods used as inputs in the
production process. High quality inputs means quality and eciency upgrading, while less costly
inputs means that the nal product is cheaper. Unlike Arnold et al. (2006), Amiti and Konings
considered not only services as input but all kind of intermediates in the production process.
Kasahara and Lapham (2006) adopted a similar approach. They created a dynamic model in
which rms simultaneously choose to export goods and import intermediates. The estimation
of structural model shows that restricting the imports for input reduces the number of Chilean
exporting rms; moving from a situation of free trade situation in intermediates to one of no
trade, reduces the percentage of exporter from 17.2% to 12.4%. They argue that cheaper and
more varied inputs increases the productivity of rms and consequently their capacity to compete
on international markets5.
It is more dicult to deal with service liberalization and input-output linkages from a theo-
retical point of view. Theoretical papers tend to be more oriented towards manufacturing rms'
cost reduction than their eciency gains. For example, Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud (2007)
demonstrated, in a monopolistic competitive framework  a la Dixit-Stigliz-Krugman, that trade
liberalization in intermediate inputs decreases the productivity cut-o for the exporting activ-
ity, due to a cost reduction. More interesting pointers, for this paper's purposes, come from
Grossman and Helpman (1991). They showed that a monopolistic competitive sector, which
produces horizontally dierentiated intermediate inputs for a single consumption-good producer,
increases the downstream TFP provided the variety of intermediate inputs also expands. Finally,
Gabsewicz and Zanaj (2007) developed a partial equilibrium model from a dierent perspective:
they found that competition in upstream markets ( a la Cournot) aects the prot of downstream
rms, and the direction of the eect depends on the downstream cost structure. In addition they
showed that there is an optimal ratio between the mass of downstream and upstream rms, for
which the prots of the downstream market increase as competition in the upstream market
increases
3 Networks in France: an example of service sector
In this section are briey described European Union (EU) and France service sectors, in partic-
ular focusing on the analysis of networks industries. The EU is characterized by free trade in
commodities but not free trade in services. The low competitive pressure in services depends on
many factors, of which four are the most important. First, some services, such as transport or
telecommunications (networks) are natural monopolies with high entry costs (for network du-
plication or network accessibility). Second, services, in Europe in particular, have traditionally
been largely state owned or highly regulated in order to maintain low prices, and to overcome
market failures such as asymmetric information. Third, services such as transport or telecom-
munication have been state owned for reasons of national strategic interest. Fourth, providers
must be located near service users (rms or consumers) because of their intrinsic nature and,
unlike manufactured goods, they cannot easily be imported6.
5Another empirical paper which deal with market liberalization is due by Pavcink (2002): she calculates that
liberalized sectors, in Chile, gain an increase in productivity of 10% higher than no imports-competing rms. The
Czech manufacturing rms may be involved in the same process independently from service liberalization.
6Sector as retailing it is not so highly regulated, compared to the other services. It is important to notice that
the characteristics across services are highly heterogenous.
3The EU tried to deal with competition in the service sector in the so-called "Bolkenstein re-
form" (Bolkestein Directive, 2006; Pisani-Ferry, 2006). The reform was introduced in an eort to
encourage competition between European service providers so as to foster eciency and quality
in services; the main declared objective was to incentives free trade in services across European
countries, with the benets split between consumers and rms. The relevance of services for
manufacturing rms is stressed by Gordon (2004) and Pisani-Ferry(2006), who claim that dif-
ferentials in productivity growth between Europe and the USA depend on dierent regulation
of the services market. They assert that the poor European performance is due to ineciencies
in services. While in EU service providers are very protected and the EU market is fragmented,
in the USA services are completely free to move from one state to another and to compete in a
larger market. This paper addresses some of these issues. It is important to understand whether
the liberalization and deregulation process due to European Union directives is relevant, and
to what extent it should be encouraged. In particular the case of France is considered in this
analysis
In 2000 France service's sector7 accounted for 70% of the country's GDP and 71% of its
labor force (OECD Survey 2000). On average, services accounted for 28% of the total inputs
to manufacturing sectors; this is relatively low compared to the UK or Germany, where services
accounted for 44% and 39% respectively (Barba-Navaretti et al., 2004). However the French
gure increased by 17% in the ve years from 1995 to 2000.
Traditionally, a large proportion of service rms in France are state-owned or under public
control, and this is particularly true for network industries, such as telecommunications, energy
(production and distribution) and transport. Public utilities are vertical integrated, so even if
the network's owner is competes in the market itself (e.g. Electricite de France, EDF) it has to
provide network access to all potential competitors for a reasonable price. The role of the state
is strong, especially in strategic sectors such as energy and telecommunications (TLC); the state
often inuences the investment decisions of foreign rms. It is worth mentioning the recent case
of the Enel-Suez merger. In 2006 the French government blocked the hostile bid of the Italian
group Enel for the privately owned rm, Suez (a vertically integrated energy rm). Instead they
merged it with the state-owned Gas de France8, in order to maintain control of energy production
and distribution in France.
A process of service sector deregulation began in 1998, and this has already yielded some
results. Following EU directives, France implemented reforms in the energy market with two
new laws, one in 2000 opening 30% of the market to competition and another in 2003 with
35%. It created RTE, a network management company independent of EDF; RTE is required to
provide producers with free and equal access to its transmission network. Since 2000 business
customers have had a free choice of suppliers, and this has been true for private customers since
2000: by April 2000, some 52 business customers (9%) had cancelled their contract with EDF9.
This situation put pressure on prices, resulting, in substantial price cuts for business customers.
The rst French deregulation reforms have begun to produce positive externalities, in terms
of lower prices, more diversied supply, and improved quality, and it has had an impact on
economic activity. Table 3.1 shows the potential benets of deregulation for all sectors (services
and manufacturing). The net potential maximum gain for the next ten years is estimated at an
annual growth of 1.41% in multi-factor productivity (MFP). From Table 3.1 it is clear that there
is a potential improvement in eciency, with a reduction in state ownership of the economy.
However it is not clear to what extent increasing competition in services brings gains for the
eciency of manufacturing rms.
7There is a list of the services considered in the analysis in Appendix B.
8The Economist 26/08/2006
9OECD France Survey 2001
4Table 3.1: Eect of easing regulation on MFPz.
MFP growth over ten years Inward FDI
% increase in the annual rate % increase in level
Economy wide regulation 0.19 0.57
Industry specic regulation 0.43 -
State ownership 0.79 -
FDI restrictions - 0.10
z Source: OECD France Survey 2005
Comparing sector data yields more interesting insights. Figure 1 (in Appendix B) shows
that productivity growth in France was driven in large part by growth in the manufacturing
sector10, rather than services. Using service data at the rm level illustrates the heterogeneity of
characteristics in the French service sector. In particular, the development of the electricity, TLC
and other business activity (OBA) sectors are analyzed. Then indices are calculated at sector
level (2-digit NACE) to proxy the level of competition and eciency. Figure (b) shows that the
labor productivity (value added per worker) in the electricity sector varied impressively across
time, possibly because of reorganization in the sector after the liberalization in 1998 and 2000.
Productivity in both TLC and OBA increased, but with a more regular path (at least for OBA).
However both TLC and electricity show a negative trend around the year 2000. The growth
or decline in productivity may depend on variations in the level of employment or value added
(due to reforms in the service sector and the labor market), rather than on gains in technical
or allocative eciency. The downturn in performance is probably due to a sharp decrease in
the rms' value added as a consequence of the reforms in public networks brought about by
the European Union's directives. An additional explanation may lie in the slow implementation
of regulatory reform: the OECD claims that the liberalization of network industries in France
lagged behind that of other large continental countries.
Figure (c) shows the average price cost margin (PCM) of services (Tybout, 2003): this is
a proxy for the average mark-ups in each sector. The average PCM increased for TLC and
decreased for electricity, reaching a similar level in 2004: as for labor productivity, there was a
sharp decrease in PCM around the year 2000, the year of the liberalization. Conversely, there was
a steady increase in PCM in the telecommunications industry: this might be explained by the
larger presence of private rms, without the serious market deregulation that fosters competition,
so that private rms are imposing monopoly prices. As discussed above, if liberalization occurs
without deregulation, private rms may partially substitute for the incumbent public rms.
Barba-Navaretti et al. (2004) suggest that liberalization without deregulation may be ineective,
because it can create a dominant position for the new incumbents, who have prots rather than
social welfare as their objective.
In the rest of this paper it will be considered liberalization and deregulation as two dierent
and complementary strategies to encourage competition in services; the former means the po-
tential entry of private actors while the latter means the relaxation of rules so as to facilitate
entry to and exit from the market. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI) may encourage
competition in services with the presence of new rms, but this is not inevitable. If the dereg-
ulation rules are not eective and precise, foreign competitors may enter directly as oligopolies,
substituting for local rms, or creating a cartel with the national incumbent (Vandenbussche and
Veurglers 1999). In this case liberalization, like encouraging FDI in services, does not have a clear
positive eect on the eciency of manufacturing rms unless the rule system for deregulation is
eective.
10Source: EU-Klems
5Another interesting measure is the Herndahl index (HHI) which is a good proxy for market
concentration. Figure (d) shows that concentration decreased sharply in the TLC industry after
1998 when France Telecom lost its monopoly. Over the same period it increased in the electricity
sector, rising to the same level (42%) as in TLC in 200411. Finally in Appendix B are reported
some descriptive statistics for the service sector in Tables B1, B2, B3.
4 Data Analysis
In this section we test the hypothesis of service competition's impact on manufacturing rms'
eciency. Three important aspects characterize the empirical analysis, with respect to previous
literature. First, the data comes from a developed country (France), instead of an economy in
transition (the Czech Republic) or a middle income country12 (Chile). The degree of development
is relevant, because there may be a "cointegration" problem between service liberalization and
productivity (as in the Czech Republic). In a transition economy, the passage from socialism to
a market economy changes the country's economic structure, given that the best rms remain
in the market and the resources are reallocated towards the most productive rms. At the same
time services are forced to be strongly liberalized and opened to foreign investments. Therefore
we can observe simultaneously an increase in the average manufacturing productivity and rising
competition in services: in this framework it is possible to overestimate the importance of services.
A second interesting issue is to verify the relevance and importance of the service sector in
a developed economy, because rms employ services as inputs more intensively in production
process. A nal point is that the indices used to proxy competition in the service sector can be
calculated using rm-level data instead of composite indices13.
This section describes the data and how the variables are constructed. Data on both the
manufacturing and the service sector were collected at the rm level. It covers the 31 industries14
listed in Appendix B. The data source is the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk,
which contains the annual balance sheet for a large number of French rms (Pisani-Ferry, 2006).
Data were collected according to the 2-digit NACE code and the observations are harmonized
with the ISIC Rev.3 classication to create the input-output matrices
4.1 Service Industries
Because of limitations on data availability, the analysis only covered medium and large service
providers (i.e. rms with operating revenues of at least 1.5 million euros in 2004). This could
be a problem when constructing sector indicators, in particular for the retail sector which is
composed of many small businesses. However given the broad denition of each service sector,
and the purposes of the paper, it seems likely that a good proxy for the degree of competition
can be obtained even from a partial dataset. In addition the empirical analysis is focused on
network industries for which the dataset is more representative. By using rms' balance sheets
competition indices are constructed, such as the Herndahl index, and the price-cost margin
for each industry. The data cover the period from 1996 to 2004, and covers 7596 service rms.
Nominal values of are deated with sector specic deators15.
11The most highly concentrated manufacturing sector in France in 2004 was motor vehicles manufacturing,
where the Herndahl index was around 6%.
12Fernandes and Paunov, 2008.
13Using rm level data I can construct service sector variables, without using any kind of arbitrary index.
1418 manufacturing sectors and 13 service industries.
15The deators were obtained from the Eurostat Ameco dataset and EU-Klems. Operating revenues, capital
stock material costs and value added were all deated.
6To measure competition and to evaluate the market structure in the service sector several
indicators are constructed for NACE 2-digit level16, and largely based on rm-level data. These
were the price cost margin (PCM), the Herndahl index (HHI), productivity (Index), and the
minimum ecient scale (MES). Also FDI are included to control for the competitive pressure
due to the presence of foreign rms.
The price cost margin (PCM) is an approximation to a rm's mark-up which can be derived
directly from balance-sheet data. Tybout (2003) suggests calculating it as the dierence between
the production value and the total variable cost, divided by the production value. A rm's PCM




p where c is the marginal cost, p is the output price, and q is






















































ht are the operating expenses (wages plus
material costs) for rm h at time t. In detail, OR
j
ht is the operating revenues of rm h, while
W
j
ht is the wage bill, and MC
j
ht material costs. Finally Equation (4.2) ) was used to construct








arithmetic mean across the j sub-industries generates the PCM index for each service industry
J. It is important to notice that the PCM approach assumes that labor and material cost are good
proxies for the short-term marginal costs. Alternatively, a second proxy for the industry J mark-
up (MKUP) was constructed, using a parametric technique based on the dual Solow residual
(Roeger, 1995), which is widely used in empirical applications (Konings and Vandenbussche,
2005). Using this method it is possible to evaluate the average industry mark-up as the coecient
of a parametric regression. The equation
Qit = ci + 0xht +
S X
s=1
sxht  tds; (4.3)
which is a simplication of an empirical analysis by Altomonte and Barattieri (2007), was
run for each J industry. The dependent variable Qht is output growth minus capital growth,
while the left hand side xht is a weighted average of the growth rates of the intermediate and
labor inputs, and coecient 1 is the average mark-up. If the variable of interest interacts with
the time dummies tdt, it is possible to recover a yearly mark-up index as the sum of average
markup 1 plus year specic coecient t.
A second index for the degree of competition is the Herndahl Index (HHI) that measures
market concentration. The concentration of the total market is calculated by rst summing the
16All the indices were calculated at the NACE 4-digit level and were then aggregated into a simple average
at the NACE 2-digit level. For notational simplicity, in this section the index j refers to the NACE 4-digit level,
while J indicates the NACE 2-digit index, composed by aggregating the j0s.
7operating revenues in the home market17 for each industry j (TOTR
j
t).. The HHI for sector j















Although small rms are not in the sample, their market shares make a negligible contribution
because they appear in a squared term. From another point of view the HHI index can be
considered as a C4 or C25 concentration index. As a proxy for the entry barriers and economies
of scale it is also used an indicator similar to HHI, called the minimum ecient scale (MES).













t is the ratio between the average value added of the larger rms (those accounting
for 50% of the industry value added d AV
j





. MES is a measure of the dimensional heterogeneity of the industry: the higher the
index the greater are the dierences in size between larger and smaller rms. The MES index
is also a proxy for the optimal rm dimension in market j: large MESs indicate that rms have
to be large to remain in the market. In other words the higher the value of MES the higher the
sunk costs associated with entry into the market, which deter potential entrants18(Maioli et al.
2005).
My nal index is a measure of turbulence (Turb), which tries to capture the degree of compe-
tition in services using the changes in rms' ranks. Firms are ranked according to their operating
revenues, and Turb is calculated as the average variation in the rank of the top ve: so rank
variation (rank) in sector j is dened as the dierence (in absolute term) between the position
of one of the rst ve rms at time t minus its rank at time t   1: If n is the ranking, then the










If a new rm enters the top ve immediately, because of mergers or dataset expansion,
rank is equal to the number of rms in industry j at time t in the dataset. The idea of the
index is to capture the dynamic competitive pressure in the service sector; if the index is high it
suggests erce competition among rms.
Some other variables are used to describe the service sector properly. Index is a measure of
service eciency (i.e. of total factor productivity). To describe services eciency it is not used
either a parametric method (commonly used for manufacturing industries, see Olley and Pakes,
1996) or a denition of labor productivity (which can be misleading, because any improvement
17Total operating revenues minus value of exports.
18Similar to MES index there is Cost Advantage Ratio Index (CAR). A cost advantage ratio (CAR) index
can be constructed using the average labor productivity instead of value added. CAR is the ratio of the labor
productivity of the smaller rms (accounting for 50% of employment) to the labor productivity of larger rms
(employing the other 50% of the labor force). CAR is also a measure of scale economies and in particular of
long-run average costs.
8may be caused by an increase in value added, due to a dominant position19). Instead, eciency
is calculated as an index which is similar to Torniqvist index, using the denition given by Aw
et al.(2001): this kind of index is commonly used to evaluate the eciency of the service sector
and in particular network industries. Let lnYit; Sift; lnXift, be the log of the output of rm
i, the input f as a proportion of total revenue, and the input consumption respectively, while
the barred terms are the arithmetic means (for NACE 4-digit industry j) of the corresponding
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 









  Sfs +  Sfs 1
 
ln  Xfs   ln  Xfs 1

: (4.8)
Here the TFP formula derives from a translog production function and the inputs considered
are the tangible xed assets, labor (labor force), and intermediate consumption. Finally variable
Index is constructed as the arithmetic mean for each NACE 2-digit sector.
Another interesting indicator is based on foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI data for France
is available as ow values from 1996 to 2004. Using the information provided by the EU-Klems
dataset about total industry labor employment, an index of FDI intensity (FDIPW) was con-
structed by dividing the value of FDI ows by the total labor force for each service industry
(NACE 2-digit). This was done to create comparable and homogenous FDI data among indus-
tries. FDIPW was intended to measure the eect on competition of foreign direct investment;
however, as discussed above, it is not possible a priori to know whether FDI will increase or
decrease the degree of competition in a given industry.
4.2 Manufacturing Industries
Information on 18 manufacturing industries is available at rm level from 1996 to 2004 The
dataset includes all rms with operating revenues greater than 1.5 million euros; like services,
there is no comparable data small rms, so the analysis is focused on medium and large rms.
However this is not a severe problem, as large rms probably make most use of service inputs to
the production process.
4.2.1 Service-Manufacturing Links
The estimated value of TFP has to be linked to the service sector variables to measure how the
market structure aects rms' productivity. For this purpose it is used a standard approach
which is frequently employed to evaluate empirically the spillover eects across sectors (Daveri
and Silva 2004; Barba-Navaretti et al. 2004, Arnold et al. 2006). Input-output (I-O) tables show
the links between the service sector and manufacturing. Since intersectoral linkages between the
sectors is the main point of interest, the competition indices are aggregated across each service
industry using I-O coecients as "connectors". A competition index was created by summing
across each industry using the I-O coecients as weights to measure inter-industry eects. The
coecients assess the relative importance of service industry j for manufacturing industry m via
19Labor productivity is calculated as value added per worker: it is only a rough measure of eciency for
situations, as here, of highly imperfect competitive markets with entry barriers. Value added may rise because a
dominant position is achieved, rather than because of a gain in eciency.





j amj  Xjt on j service sectors (4.9)
where Xjt is a generic index (described in Section 5.1) for the service industry j at time t.
The amj coecients measure the service inputs that a rm in the manufacturing industry m pur-
chases on average from service industry j, as a proportion of total inputs Therefore SMSL(X)m
t
captures the average eect of services on the manufacturing industry m (which includes rm i)
It is important to emphasize that the I-O coecients are taken as constant over time. Data
from the year 2000 was used to construct the I-O tables, because 2000 is in the middle of the
observational period. The implicit assumption behind this is that average input mix does not
change with time for each NACE 2-digit sector, so that amj is a reliable mean. Besides I-O
coecients do not vary over time, with I-O tables for year 1995 and 2005, to be more precise
in the interpretation of results: if the opposite were true it would not be possible to disentangle
the eects of competition in services on productivity from that of changes in the technical mix
of inputs (because service consumption cannot be observed for each rm). To summarize, the
estimated coecients for Equation (4.9) is expected negative, namely it will suggest a negative
eect on average productivity: as long as the service sector indices rise (except Turb and Index,
where the opposite is true), competition in services decreases.
4.2.2 TFP and Input Price Bias
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of competition in services on the performance of
manufacturing rms, or, more precisely, on manufacturing rms' total factor productivity (TFP).
TFP is measured as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function which includes three
inputs: capital, labor and materials (intermediate inputs). While revenues/sales are deated with
a wholesale deator, and capital with a tangible xed asset deator, information is available for
labor about the total number of employees.
There is a relevant issue about the intermediate input variable, and its price deator, because
the productivity estimation and the subsequent regressions could be seriously invalidated by
unobservable input price components (Klette and Griliches, 1996) which generate bias. Even
when the production function is correctly estimated, taking endogeneity into account (Olley and
Pakes, 1996; Levinshon and Petrin, 2003), the problem of unobserved prices across all input and









where the capital letters are the input and output quantities, Ait is the unobserved produc-
tivity, and the 's are the coecients to be estimated. Usually, using balance sheet data, values
are observed but quantities are not, so the input and output values are divided by a price index
to yield an approximation of the quantity. The deated values are then a rough measure of the
input and output quantities. The problem occurs if a common price deator is used across all
rms and industries, instead of observing an individual industry's price vector (or, even better,
20DeLoecker (2007) suggested an estimation technique to solve the problem of unobservable output price intro-
ducing explicitly output' imperfect competition market and demand shock in production function's estimation.
10individual rm's prices). To describe this problem better, it is assumed that it is possible to iden-
tify all prices except the material inputs, for which a general deator, cI is used Then applying
OP's method, the estimated TFP for rm i is
tfpit = !it + uit   m (cit   cIt); (4.10)
where !it is the rm's productivity (term of interest), uit is the i:i:d: error term, and
m (cit   cIt) is the bias due to the unobserved intermediate input price, and cit and cIt are
the unobserved input price and the material deator respectively. The baseline equation used in
the next section is then
tfpm
it = 0 + 1SMSLm
t + it:
The SMSLm
t term approximates competition in services, and links services with the manu-
facturing sector m. The idea is that more competition in services increases the number of service
providers and their quality, generating a positive eect on the average rm's productivity. This
average eect is measured by 1. Given that the estimated TFP is the dependent variable in the
empirical analysis, the evaluation of the eect of competition in services on eciency could be









@m (cit   cIt)
@SMSL
: (4.11a)
The analysis is focused on @!it
@SMSL, the average eect of competition on average productivity,
while
@z(cit cIt)
@SMSL is the eect of competition on input prices. Therefore the coecient 1 will not
only capture the eciency eect but also the eect of competition in services on the unobserved
material price. For this reasons, two dierent price indices are employed. First, given that the
dataset provides information about rms' consumption of material (and not their consumption
of services), it is calculated a composite deator for the material input as in Arnold et al. (2006),
and which is specic to each m industry. Given that a large proportion of production inputs
are still materials purchased from other manufacturing rms, the aim is to reduce (cit   cIt).
Because the input prices are not directly reported by Amadeus, it is calculated the material
price index as a weighted average of the output price indices (deflnt) for each manufacturing





mn  deflnt: (4.12)
The coecient mn is not the same as Equation (4:9) but it is "rescaled". Now it is the
ratio between manufacturing input purchase by sector m to sector n over the total amount
manufacture purchase done by sector m. Then variable IDm
t it is the deator for the material
input to rm i in industry m. This solution is not a silver bullet, but the composite deator gives
us some condence that the 1-bias generated by unobserved material prices has been reduced,
since the index in Equation (4:12) is industry specic, and takes account of variations in all the
input prices in manufacturing. Finally the production function is estimated separately industry
by industry using the semi-parametric method described by Olley and Pakes21 (1996).
The second price term used is the price deator for services, specic to each manufacturing
industry. It is plugged directly into the TFP regressions. As argued above, such a price index is
21Recently Mairasse et al.(2008) have shown that input price bias in the estimation of production functions is
not important:, as the estimations do not change when price information is included.
11necessary to disentangle the eects on manufacturing rms' eciency of variation in competition
from that of variation in the price of services22.
5 Empirical Specication
The aim of this section is to understand if raising competition in the service market increase
the productivity of the average downstream rm. To explore this, it is looked for a statistical
relation between rms' TFP and the service-link variables (see Equation (4.9)), using micro
data. A great advantage comes from using rm level data, because the regression can use the
rms' xed eects to capture unobserved individual heterogeneity deriving from their location,
internal characteristics, etc. Additionally, with rm-level data, indices such as those described
in Equation (4.9) for manufacturing can be constructed for manufacturing too, to control for the
level of competition level in the intermediate-inputs market. The baseline regression estimated








t + P(S)mt + Dt + ci + "it, (5.1)
where TFPm
it is the total factor productivity of manufacturing rm i in industry m at
time t, and SMSL(X)m
t is the constructed variable of interest which relates the service in-
dustry's market-structure to the manufacturing sectors It is important to notice that the eect
of SMSL(X)m
t is not at rm level but at industry level (NACE 2-digit), so the estimated coe-
cient 1 has to be interpreted as the eect of competition in services on the average productivity
of the manufacturing industry, or, as it is showed in Section 4, 1 is @TFP
@s . Here, like Arnold
et al. (2004) , but unlike Fernandes and Paunov (2008), the variable of interest is dened on
the same time period as the dependent variable. Even if lagged variables were used, the results
would be the same. In addition the rm-level control variables23 (Fm
it ) are added, such as the
log of capital intensity24 (Ln(KL)), the export status25 dummy (Export), and the wage bill as
proportion of total revenues (LabC), to the estimation.
Since the majority of inputs come from the other manufacturing industries, it is introduced
HHI(M)m
t which captures the eect of competition in the manufacturing input market, into
the regression. HHI(M)m
t is constructed according to Equation (4:9) where the Xjt term is the
concentration index26 (Herndahl index).
It is also included in the regression a proxy for services, the input price P(S)mt, that is
an input service deator27, specic to each manufacturing industry. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, the price index is included among the regressors, such that the coecient 1
22If the cost of service inputs decreases, the consumption of services rises, but the marginal productivity of
services shrinks. Then the eect on TFP is unknown: it can either increase or decrease.
23I also used the average wage and the rm's PCM, as dened in Equation (4.1), as control variables. The
coecients are not signicant and the nal conclusions do not change. The PCM was employed to control for
potential gains in productivity due to rm mark-ups, i.e. potential gains derived from extra prots (Konings and
Vandenbussche, 2008).
24Tangible xed assets divided by total employment of labor.
25This variable is included to explore whether trading activity aects productivity (Clerides, Leach, Tybout,
1998). I also included Export among the state variables used in the estimation of the production function to
control for learning through the exporting process (De Loecker, 2007). The results do not depend on which of
with the two measures of TFP is used.
26I also controlled for other proxies, such as the industry-average PCM. A specic price deator was included
in the estimation of TFP, to take price variation in the manufacturing input market into account.
27EU-KLEMS database.
12(Equation 4:11a) captures the eect of competition on rms' eciency, and not the eect of
price variation. Finally ci is the unobserved heterogeneity, "it is the idiosyncratic error term,
and Dt are year dummies to control for business cycles. Table ?? presents the results obtained
with OLS regressions for all the service industries aggregated together (the S in parenthesis); it
gives the avor of the relationship.
Table 5.1: Baseline OLS regressionz.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
Price(S)mt 0.031*** 0.007 0.010* -0.002 -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.040***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
FDIPW(S)mt 1.749*** 2.007*** 2.221*** 1.564*** 1.291*** 0.473*** 1.490***













HHI(M)mt -9.919*** -8.647*** -9.574*** -10.208*** -10.945*** -10.478*** -7.617***
[0.228] [0.231] [0.228] [0.230] [0.230] [0.235] [0.238]
Exdumimt 1 0.106*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.077***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.123***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
LabCimt 1 1.508*** 1.505*** 1.519*** 1.523*** 1.510*** 1.481*** 1.473***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Obs 51692 51692 51692 51689 51692 51692 51692
R2 0.201 0.211 0.205 0.190 0.185 0.197 0.240
z Ordinary Least Sqaure. Robust standard error, clusterd by sector, are in squared brackets. Time dummies
included.
As expected, manufacturing productivity (TFP) increases as competition in services increases.
It is interesting to notice that FDI intensity (FDIPW) is positively related to rms' TFP, as is
the average eciency in the service sector (Index). The other results are quite intuitive. For
example, the positive signs of Ln(KL) and export status: however the cost of labor (LabC) also
has a positive coecient, which is a bit puzzling
Nonetheless the estimation of Equation (5:1) may be problematic if there is unobserved het-
erogeneity among the rms; one potential solution may be to implement a xed-eect estimator.
However the variables in the equation are likely to be jointly endogenous. In particular the Fm
it
variables can be endogenous because of simultaneity or to two-way causality with dependent
variable: moreover the Equation (5:1) could fail in the strict exogeneity assumption, given that
productivity can be dependent on its past realizations, and Fm
it variables are lagged by one pe-
riod. The presence of endogenous variables and the state dependency for rms' TFP will bias the
estimates of the coecients. To address these problems it is used the dynamic panel estimation
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and the system-GMM procedure presented
by Blundell and Bond (1998).A concern arises with the GMM estimator if there is no evidence
of rm-specic eects, in which case it is more ecient to estimate the equation in levels (using
13lagged levels as instruments) than in rst dierences. However several tests suggest the existence









t + P(S)mt + Dt + ci + "it .
(5.2)
In a nutshell, the system GMM is composed by a system of two equations29: an equation in
rst dierences and a second one in levels. First-dierences are used to eliminate the rm-specic
eects, and then lagged levels of the variables are employed as instruments. Then an equation
in levels is added, and the variables in each level are instrumented by variables in dierences.
6 Results
This Section will discuss the results of the empirical analysis30. The rst set of tables (Tables
6.1 and 6) show the results where regressor SMSL(X)m
t (4.9) is constructed using all 13 service
sectors. The estimator implemented is "system-GMM" in order to take into account the endo-
geneity of rms' control variables and state dependency; the TFP is lagged by two periods to
get rid of serial correlation in the error term31. Finally sector dummies are not included because
large part of regressors SMSL(X)m
t are at sector level too, and sector dummies would have not
added anything to the estimation.
Table 6.1 shows the estimation results using SMSLm
t (4.9) which includes the aggregated
service-sector variables(S in parenthesis). The regressors used to proxy competition in services
were the FDI per worker (FDIPW), plus all the competition proxies separately: the indices
used have to be interpreted as the inverse of the degree of competition. When the PCM or
the HHI rises, the degree of competition decreases. It is evident that the average mark-up
in the service sector (with either denition) has a negative eect on average productivity; as
expected more market power in upstream rms can reduce the competitiveness of downstream
rms. The coecient of the concentration index (HHI), is also signicant and negative: therefore
on average more concentration in services has a negative eect on rms' eciency. The proxy
for scale economies (MES) also has a negative sign and is signicant, as expected: larger entry
barriers reduce the productivity of downstream rms. If the PCM or HHI index grows by 1%
the average rms' productivity decreases by 1:9% and 1:3% respectively. Further considerations
come from other service variables. The Index coecient is positive but not signicant. FDIPW
has a positive eect on manufacturing rms' eciency: it seems that the FDI intensity enhances
competition, and does not have a substitution eect with national incumbents. Finally, the
service price coecient (Price(S)) is negative but not signicant for all specications: with the
introduction of the service price index into the regression, FDI can capture the technical spillover
28I test for the presence of rst-order serial correlation, which indicate the presence of unobserved rm-specic
eects. Then Mundalak test, introduced by Wooldridge (2002), indicates that xed eect estimator is better than
random eects.
29System GMM by Blundell Bond (1998) is advised if the autoregressive term of dependent variable (0) is
close to one. In this case I run a simple OLS regression of actual TFP value on past value and 1 was 0.95. In
addition with rst dierence GMM the Hansen and Sargan Test test do not pass for several specications (also
with orthogonal deviations).
30The sample used in the analysis is a reduced sample. I consider 98% of rms, excluding those which had
growth rates of TFP below the 1st and above the 99th centile.
31The lags used as instruments do not change across dierent specications: they vary from the second lag up
to the end of available observations. In addition one step estimator is used to avoid correction for robust standard
errors. Two step estimator gives similar results.
14Table 6.1: Aggregated Services - Baseline Equationz.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
TFPimt 1 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.751*** 0.752*** 0.749*** 0.735*** 0.733***
[0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.083] [0.084] [0.084]
TFPimt 2 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.231*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.240***
[0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.085] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084]
Price(S)mt -0.007 -0.009** -0.007 -0.009** -0.012** -0.012** -0.010**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
FDIPW(S)mt 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.051*** 0.037** 0.036*** 0.067***













HHI(M)mt -0.043 0.045 -0.015 -0.061 -0.137 -0.188 0.019
[0.161] [0.154] [0.161] [0.162] [0.172] [0.165] [0.142]
Exdumimt 1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
LabCimt 1 -0.019 -0.024 -0.026 -0.020 -0.018 -0.024 -0.031
[0.066] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067]
Obs 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912
Firms 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731
Instr. 8731 99 99 99 99 99 102
Hansen Test 0.353 0.401 0.306 0.406 0.393 0.363 0.385
Hansen Test Lev 0.640 0.664 0.582 0.618 0.665 0.659 0.710
AR2 Test 0.231 0.219 0.238 0.259 0.257 0.217 0.196
z System GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. Time dummies included both
as variables and instruments. One step estimator used. Signicance level: * is the p-value>0.1, ** is
the p-value>0.05, and *** is the p-value>0.01. Instr: total number of instruments. Lev: Hansen test
for the equation in levels.
eect from services to manufacturing sectors (backward spillover). In Column (7) all the indices
are plugged into the estimation together. The signicance of some of the individual coecients
decreases, probably because the indices are highly inter-correlated. The degree of competition
in manufacturing HHI(M) does not aect rms' eciency. The rms' control variables are all
considered endogenous, and only the capital intensity, as expected, has a signicant eect on
productivity.
An interesting extension may be the existence of non-linear eects of competition in services.
In other words, an excess of liberalization and deregulation in the upstream market was predicted
to harm the average productivity in downstream markets. Table 6 shows the results of estimating
Equation(5:2) with the introduction of quadratic terms for PCM, HHI, Turb, and MES.
We see that only the rst two columns give interesting results. The sign of the variables
changes, and they become negative in the squared term: only HHI and PCM are signicant, and
even these terms are not strongly signicant. This supports the hypothesis that an excess of
15Table 6.2: Aggregated Services - Quadratic Termz.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
TFPimt 1 0.730*** 0.728*** 0.747*** 0.746***
[0.084] [0.084] [0.083] [0.084]
TFPimt 2 0.244*** 0.249*** 0.228*** 0.237***
[0.084] [0.085] [0.084] [0.085]
Price(S)mt -0.002 -0.007 -0.011** -0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
FDIPW(S)mt 0.025 0.055** 0.027 0.035





















HHI(M)mt -0.143 -0.012 -0.135 0.033
[0.172] [0.158] [0.172] [0.160]
Exdumimt 1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.024**
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
LabCimt 1 -0.019 -0.026 -0.018 -0.028
[0.067] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067]
Obs 39912 39912 39912 39912
Firms 8731 8731 8731 8731
Instr. 99 99 99 99
Hansen Test 0.382 0.422 0.376 0.295
Hansen Test Lev. 0.686 0.741 0.632 0.594
AR2 Test 0.193 0.167 0.245 0.213
z System GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in squared brack-
ets. Time dummies included both as variables and instruments. One
step estimator used. Signicance level: * is the p-value>0.1, ** is
the p-value>0.05, and *** is the p-value>0.01. Instr: total number
of instruments. Lev: Hansen test for the equation in levels.
competition is harmful. This may depend on the characteristics of the service industries, which
in some cases, such as networks, need large dimensions or some degree of market power to recover
the huge investments they have had to make, or to exploit economies of scale. Prices and FDI
do not change their sign, but they are no longer strongly signicant.
Despite these results, which appear to support my hypotheses, it is necessary to be careful
with their interpretation for one simple reason: the variable SMSLm
t includes within itself the
characteristics of a variety of heterogeneous service industries, and so the coecients embody the
features of all these industries. For example, land transport (60) has high natural barrier and
dierent regulation from the nancial intermediation (65) industry; the number of competitors
16in the telecommunications sector is much smaller than the number of rms in the retailing sector;
etc. Additionally, there are many rms in sectors such as retailing and other business services
which are not included in the data, because they are too small. For these reasons, another
set of regressions are estimated, with a dierent aggregation level in the competition indices
(see Equation(4.9)). Cross-sectional linkages are constructed for the network industries32 only.
Network industries are chosen because these are characterized by high xed costs and a low
level of competition. In addition, given the average size of the businesses in the industry, the
dataset for network services is quite representative of the entire population. Table 6 presents the
results of the GMM estimation using the indices relating to the network industries only. The
corresponding OLS results are shown in Table D.
Table 6.3: Network Services - Baseline Equationz.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
TFPimt 1 0.739*** 0.743*** 0.738*** 0.739*** 0.751*** 0.721*** 0.716***
[0.083] [0.082] [0.082] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.083]
TFPimt 2 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.221*** 0.241*** 0.247***
[0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.084] [0.083]
Price(N)mt -0.323*** -0.252*** -0.258*** -0.304*** -0.348*** -0.557*** -0.581***
[0.090] [0.093] [0.094] [0.089] [0.104] [0.141] [0.161]
FDIPW(N)mt 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.107*** 0.121***













HHI(M)mt -0.673*** -0.619** -0.628** -0.619** -0.607** -0.800*** -0.914***
[0.259] [0.252] [0.253] [0.253] [0.258] [0.270] [0.284]
Exdumimt 1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025** 0.022** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.029***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
LabCimt 1 -0.022 -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.018 -0.032 -0.021
[0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [0.066] [0.064]
Obs 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912 39912
Firms 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731 8731
Instr. 99 99 99 99 99 99 102
Hansen Test 0.402 0.491 0.411 0.378 0.474 0.492 0.512
Hansen Test Lev. 0.521 0.620 0.546 0.392 0486 0.525 0.723
AR2 Test 0.2225 0.2344 0.2119 0.2155 0.2780 0.1888 0.1678
z System GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. Time dummies included both as
variables and instruments. One step estimator used. Signicance level: * is the p-value>0.1, ** is the
p-value>0.05, and *** is the p-value>0.01. Instr: total number of instruments. Lev: Hansen test for the
equation in levels.
The results do not change with these specications. The coecients for the competition
32Energy(40), land transports(60) water transports(61), air transports(62), auxiliary transport activities(63)
and telecommunication (64).
17proxies are still negative and signicant, while in some cases (MKUP and PCM) the magnitude
increases in Column (2), (5), and (7). It seems that the eciency of the network industry
(Index(N)) is now important for TFP in manufacture (coecient is positive and signicant in
Column(6)). Price(N)33 coecient is greater in Table 6 than in Table 6.1, as is the signicance of
the eect. The interpretations of the other coecients does not change, with the exception of the
negative and signicant sign for HHI(M), which is more realistic. To conclude, the introduction
of dierent indices does not produce any substantive changes in the previous results, even if the
statistical relation is stronger.
Finally, it is performed the same exercise for the other three service groups (retail, nancial
services and other business activities, see Table A.1; the results are not shown, but the coecients
were not signicant in any case. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that network industries
really matter for the eciency of manufacturing rms, via the inputs used.
It is also calculated the quadratic term for the network indices; the results are shown in Table
6. The results are generally similar to those in Table 6, with the HHI(N) coecients being large
and signicant in both analyses. However FDIPW(N), unlike FDIPW(S) is highly signicant in
all four regressions.
To conclude this section robustness check is performed. The sample of manufacturing rms
was split into two groups, one formed of large rms (L) and the other of medium-sized and
medium small rms (MS). Large rms have, on average, more than 250 employees, while small
rms have fewer than 250 employees. The idea is to explore whether service inputs are more
important for large or small rms. The results are shown in Tables 6 and D. The rst four
columns show the regression results for the sub-sample of large rms, while the last four refer
to the medium-small rms. The tables indicate that competition in services is more important
for large rms rather than medium-sized and small ones. This may be because large enterprises
use services intensively in their production. If we assume this last statement to be true, the
coecients in Tables 6 and D are clearly comprehensible.
33Price(N) is constructed as a weighted mean of output deators for all networks, using as weights the I-O
coecients. Price(S) is directly derived by EU-KLEMS.
18Table 6.4: Network Services - Quadratic Termz.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
TFPimt 1 0.734*** 0.744*** 0.711*** 0.745***
[0.083] [0.082] [0.085] [0.083]
TFPimt 2 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.262*** 0.228***
[0.083] [0.082] [0.086] [0.083]
Price(N)mt -0.663*** -0.307 0.214 -0.266**
[0.175] [0.217] [0.353] [0.120]
FDIPW(N)mt 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.053**





















HHI(M)mt -0.454 -0.588** -1.550** -0.685***
[0.291] [0.271] [0.687] [0.258]
Exdumimt 1 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025** 0.027***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
LabCimt 1 -0.033 -0.021 -0.038 -0.023
[0.066] [0.065] [0.068] [0.066]
Obs 39912 39912 39912 39912
Firms 8731 8731 8731 8731
Instr 99 99 99 99
Hansen Test 0.522 0.460 0.541 0.520
Hansen Test Lev. 0.515 0.610 0.609 0.711
AR2 Test 0.203 0.240 0.136 0.242
z System GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in squared brack-
ets. Time dummies included both as variables and instruments. One
step estimator used. Signicance level: * is the p-value>0.1, ** is
the p-value>0.05, and *** is the p-value>0.01. Instr: total number




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20The aim of the section was to explore empirically whether competition in services matters
for the productivity of manufacturing rms because of the contribution services make to their
inputs. To sum up, it is now possible to state that competition and the market structure or
service industries have a signicant and non-negligible eect on the productivity of manufacturing
industries. Network services may well be the cause of this relationship, because of the importance
of their input (communication, energy and transport) Secondly, the eect of competition on
downstream eciency is not linear: insisting on perfect competition in services is not the best way
to foster the eciency downstream. There are economies of scale that have to be exploited, as well
as investments to recover. Unfortunately it is not possible to infer the average level of competition
for each industry from the coecients 1; the index in Equation (4.9) is a weighted average of
a specic term across service industries. Information about rms' individual consumption of
services would be extremely useful for exploring these issues further.
7 Conclusions
This paper has tried to assess the importance of the market structure of the service sector for
manufacturing rms. On one hand, services comprise an increasing proportion of the inputs
used by manufacturing rms, and so concerns about services are rising. On the other hand,
competition in the service market is completely dierent from competition in traditional sectors
for historical and technical reasons. Services operate in a highly regulated and protected market,
while manufacturing rms are exposed to global competition. This kind of asymmetry could
create problems, for rms' competitiveness: manufacturing performances can be signicantly
aected. This concern is not negligible in particular for rms' productivity and large rms.
The paper suggests that this kind of relation is driven by the competition in network service
industries.
However if competition is pushed further, the benets for manufacturing rms decrease: the
existence of investments and economies to scale that have to be exploited, requires a certain
threshold of "protection" to ensure that high quality services are provided.
The empirical results suggest a bunch of preliminary policy conclusions. Some of the inef-
ciencies in upstream sectors are caused by over-regulation and entry barriers that reduce the
positive eect of competition, and pro-competitive policies in the tertiary sector should translate
into better services for manufacturing rms. However it is important to stress that services are
highly heterogenous among them, and policy makers have to be aware about dierent inter-
ventions. In particular network service industries have three main characteristics making them
dierent from manufacturing: they are of strategic interest for a national economy, there are
natural entry barriers to many of them (i.e. it is too costly to duplicate a network); and they
do not face international competition from exports. Therefore in the light of previous results,
there may be four reasonable arguments against deregulation and liberalization: a) a fear that
the public service ethic will be compromised, b) a concern that employees will lose their social
benets; c) worries about whether the regulated industries can promote innovation and industrial
development; and d) the perceived risk of "market failure" in a competitive environment.
To conclude, further analysis is required for more accurate results, with particular attention
to the dierent types of services that manufacturing uses. In particular it seems fruitful to test
if competition in services aect the international competition of manufacturing rms, i.e. their
ability to enter in the export market. However more detailed dataset containing information
about service consumption at rm level or at higher level of disaggregation should be used for
this work .
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23A Data Description
Table A.1: Sectors-Manufactures and Services






24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
27 Manufacture of basic metals
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
30 Manufacture of oce machinery and computers
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery
32 Manufacture of radio, television, communication equipment
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Manufacture of motor vehicle
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
36 Other Manufactures n.e.c.
Services
40 Energy Network Services
50 Wholesale and Retail Retail
60 Land Transport Network Services
61 Water Transport Network Services
62 Air Transport Network Services
63 Auxiliary transport services Network Services
64 Telecommunication and posts Network Services
65 Financial Intermediation Financial Service
70 Real estate activities Other Business
72 Computer and Related activities Other Business
73 R&D Other Business
74 Other Business activities Other Business
Table A.2: FDI ows in Francez.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
FDI FLOWS (Millions of Euros)
17128 20619 27866 43688 46945 56407 51695 41627
FDI FLOWS in Manufacturing (Millions of Euros)
3897 4542 7071 8131 14897 11906 20036 8793
FDI FLOWS in Services (Millions of Euros)
14061 15589 18851 33675 29471 47313 36650 32532
Percentage of Service FDI on Total FDI
0.82 0.75 0.68 0.77 0.63 0.84 0.71 0.78
z Source: OECD
24Table A.3: Production function estimation Olley & Pakesz.
Sector Labor SE(l) Material SE(m) Capital SE(k)
15 0.252 0.010 0.542 0.013 0.017 0.010
17 0.213 0.015 0.446 0.031 -0.031 0.031
18 0.069 0.023 0.376 0.062 0.071 0.039
19 0.198 0.027 0.511 0.027 0.056 0.066
22 0.343 0.026 0.196 0.011 0.064 0.017
24 0.275 0.017 0.459 0.016 0.068 0.018
25 0.351 0.014 0.495 0.023 0.076 0.028
26 0.275 0.011 0.467 0.023 0.040 0.015
27 0.186 0.020 0.563 0.013 0.070 0.046
28 0.471 0.012 0.236 0.010 0.024 0.015
29 0.497 0.025 0.287 0.018 0.046 0.030
30 0.647 0.060 0.419 0.031 0.047 0.101
31 0.415 0.032 0.402 0.021 0.009 0.017
32 0.368 0.036 0.437 0.038 0.075 0.044
33 0.453 0.022 0.289 0.020 0.143 0.047
34 0.328 0.026 0.514 0.043 0.044 0.053
35 0.495 0.031 0.207 0.021 0.141 0.071
36 0.401 0.011 0.473 0.017 0.059 0.026
z Source: Amadeus Dataset Standard errors boostrapped over 100
replications. Time dummies included.
B Competition in Services
Table B.1: Services sector competition index: year-sectorz.
Index-Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
HHI-40 0.2002 0.1873 0.3401 0.1815 0.1833 0.2334 0.2372 0.2754 0.4168
HHI-64 0.8440 0.8137 0.8186 0.8074 0.5448 0.4447 0.4380 0.3380 0.4269
HHI-74 0.0810 0.0796 0.0754 0.0689 0.0652 0.0649 0.0605 0.0549 0.0471
Index-40 -0.1386 -0.1478 -0.1314 0.0149 -0.0208 -0.1367 -0.0206 0.1420 -0.0589
Index-64 0.4776 0.2013 0.5005 0.9121 1.0419 1.2418 0.8465 1.1290 0.9204
Index-74 -0.1598 0.0525 0.1644 0.3787 0.4816 0.4764 0.5047 0.5464 0.3985
PCM-40 0.6763 0.6534 0.6646 0.6340 0.6396 0.5557 0.6176 0.6386 0.6021
PCM-64 0.6993 0.6875 0.7041 0.6998 0.6625 0.6699 0.7062 0.6778 0.7434
PCM-74 0.4334 0.4066 0.4199 0.4308 0.4015 0.3847 0.3873 0.3951 0.3792
z Source: Calculation from Amadeus dataset. TFP calculated according to equation 4.8.
25Figure 1: Competition in Services.
(a) TFP Growth value added based for France (base
year 1995, TFP=100).
(b) Average Sector Productivity: Eciency Index.
(c) Average Price Cost Margin (d) Herndahl Index
Table B.2: Average Competition Indecesz.
Sector HHI PCM MES MKUP Index
40 0.251 0.630 10.876 0.906 -0.059
50 0.108 0.196 9.179 1.261 0.357
60 0.051 0.563 9.688 3.768 0.306
61 0.230 0.786 10.480 9.724 0.477
62 0.345 0.693 10.847 3.772 0.475
63 0.086 0.700 9.908 1.890 0.263
64 0.608 0.696 11.968 4.802 0.920
65 0.219 0.387 10.670 1.463 1.206
70 0.097 0.664 10.395 1.131 -0.152
71 0.158 0.659 10.622 1.854 0.390
72 0.081 0.456 10.489 1.982 0.728
73 0.120 0.497 10.433 1.952 0.047
74 0.066 0.397 11.089 1.115 0.398
z Source: Amadeus Dataset
C Mark-up estimation.
One method to estimate markup is suggested and demonstrated by Roeger (1995). The pro-
cedure is very useful for micro level data but it allow us only to estimate average markup (as
parameter) and not year variant index. This methodology accounts problems of endogeneity and
simultaneity of investment on productivity shocks for the estimation of markups at rm level.
26Table B.3: Number of rms in services: year sectorz.
Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
40 45 46 51 53 61 66 71 70 75
50 2690 2765 2867 2978 3168 3296 3482 3543 3821
60 191 192 200 205 215 216 223 231 249
61 16 17 17 19 22 22 24 24 27
62 12 13 15 16 15 15 18 19 21
63 259 268 283 289 300 307 316 330 342
64 20 24 30 36 47 53 52 59 61
65 78 87 106 119 183 219 254 279 344
70 312 326 364 365 405 433 456 487 524
71 93 95 101 98 107 113 119 132 141
72 154 167 183 203 227 244 250 256 266
73 31 33 35 35 38 39 42 43 46
74 744 772 865 928 1238 1418 1591 1783 2039
Total 4645 4805 5117 5344 6026 6441 6898 7256 7956
z Source: Amadeus Dataset
Giving a short summarize of the procedure we can understand better the benet in applying it:
for a more detailed analysis I advice to refer to Roeger (1995)2.
Starting to consider a linear homogeneous production function with three inputs, so rm i in
period t will have as production function
Yit= AitG(Lit;Kit;Mit) (C.1)
where Y is the production while L, K, M are respectively inputs of labor, capital and
other intermediates and Ait represents variation in eciency for i at time t. Under imperfect
competition, the Solow residual can be written as
SRit = (Y it Kit)   Lit(Lit Kit)   Mit(Mit Kit) (C.2)
= Bit(Y it Kit) + (1   Bit)Ait
where Xit is the log dierence of variable Xit and Jit = PJitJit=PitYit are shares of j-th
input on total sales. The SR could be divided in two dierent components: imperfect competition
term (Bit(Yit   Kit) ) and technology growth term (Ait). Then market power of i-th at
time t rm is measured by Bit = (Pit  cit)=Pit = 1 1=it where cit is rm marginal cost, Pit is
the good price and it is the price cost mark-up. Shares and factor input are observable but it
is necessary to estimate markups and productivity shocks: it could be dicult estimate Bit (and
markups), given that (Yit   Kit) and Ait are correlated. We can just imagine technology
shock composed by two parts (as Olley and Pakes 1996)
Ait= it+!it (C.3)
Firms productivity is composed by unexpected shocks due to external factors (!it as white
noise) and an expected components (it) due to conscious investment choices: clearly both are
2The paper was written to give an ansewer to TFP measurement problems, as simultaneity bias. He argued
that Solow residual measurement errors are caused by endogenity of productivity shocks with capital stock.
Markup is due to the fact that we are in a framework of imperfect competition
27unobserved by econometricians. The expected  could be correlated with inputs levels so OLS
suer of simultaneity: nd right instruments could be an hard task. Roeger derives a dual Solow
residual, price based, where wit, ritand zitare respectively the labor wage (Lit), capital rental
price(Kit) and intermediate inputs cost(Mit) for rm i at time t,
DSRit= Litwit+Mitzit+(1   Lit Mit)rit (C.4)
If we subtract (C:4) from (C:2) we get net Solow residual
SRit DSRit = (Y it+Pit)   Lit(L + wit)  (C.5)
Mit(Mit+zit)
 (1   Lit Mit)(Kit+rit)
= Bit[(Y it+Pit)   (Kit+rit)]
where term (1   Bit)Ait which is source of endogeneity, does not appear. Now equation
(C:2) could be evaluated without using instrumental variables. Rearranging (C:5) we can write
(Y it+Pit)   (Kit+rit) (C.6)
= itfLit[(Lit+wit) (Kit+rit)]
+Mit[(Mit+zit)   (Kit+rit)]g:
Considering that Xitare log dierences, we can estimate it quite easily: the parenthesis
terms are nominal growth rate so the right hand side is output growth minus capital growth,
while left hand side is a weighted average of intermediate and labor input growth rate. We have
data on a period of 10 years but that's not enough to calculate markup of each rm separately,
so it is possible to measure average markup it as parameter of composite variable xit(right
hand side of C.6)
Qit= i+1xit+it (C.7)
where 1 is the markup, term i is rm specic heterogeneity and it is white noise error
term. The coecients are estimated with a xed eect estimator
28D Additional Tables
Table D.1: Network Services - OLS Baseline Equationz.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt TFPimt
Price(N)mt -2.698*** -2.121*** -2.624*** -3.341*** -3.774*** -5.485*** -5.040***
[0.115] [0.141] [0.138] [0.119] [0.140] [0.106] [0.204]
FDIPW(N)mt 1.931*** 1.906*** 1.927*** 1.930*** 1.828*** 2.346*** 2.611***













HHI(M)mt -18.142*** -18.048*** -18.030*** -17.828*** -18.176*** -17.760*** -19.357***
[0.250] [0.246] [0.247] [0.243] [0.246] [0.240] [0.251]
Exdumimt 1 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.048***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Ln(KL)imt 1 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.098*** 0.127***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
LabCimt 1 1.505*** 1.508*** 1.505*** 1.489*** 1.490*** 1.300*** 1.212***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
Obs 51692 51692 51692 51689 51692 51692 51692
R2 0.179 0.179 0.178 0.182 0.181 0.244 0.280
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